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P
redatory lending, which encompasses a range of 
ﬁ nancial practices that are oft en targeted at low-
income individuals and threaten their income and 
assets, is becoming increasingly prevalent in rural 
communities. While predatory lending practices can include 
check-cashing outlets for payday loans, car title loans, refund 
anticipation loans and rent-a-center loans, among others,1 
this report focuses on predatory practices in the housing 
market. A home is usually a person’s largest investment, 
making home mortgages a prime target for predatory lend-
ing. 
Using targeted marketing and promises of “easy credit” 
and “quick cash,” predatory lenders can trap borrowers in a 
cycle of high interest payments, abusive fees and terms that 
can lead to home foreclosures, and ultimately devastate bor-
rowers’ ﬁ nancial futures.
Individuals and communities that have few lending 
options are vulnerable to predatory products.2 Th e use of 
these products appears to be growing in rural areas, where 
there are fewer commercial ﬁ nancial banking ﬁ rms serv-
ing rural borrowers than in urban counties.3 Lacking access 
to ﬁ nancial alternatives, rural residents are susceptible to a 
range of predatory ﬁ nancial institutions and products that 
charge excessive fees and diminish their ability to save and 
build wealth.
Th is brief examines predatory mortgage loans, which have 
emerged in the expanding subprime mortgage market, look-
ing at who is most at risk of being abused by such lending 
practices and where these practices occur. One key ﬁ nding 
is that rural minorities are more likely than whites to take 
out High APR Loans or “HALs.” Th e report also details the 
widespread use of HALs to purchase manufactured housing, 
a key component of the rural housing market. A Maine case 
study illustrates the persistence of predatory lending in rural 
communities. Th e report concludes with recommendations 
to address predatory lending practices at the federal and 
state levels.
Predatory Mortgage Lending Hurts 
Families
Children have a better chance for success when they are 
raised in families who own their own home and have stable 
ﬁ nancial assets.  When parents or caregivers have little sav-
ings to fall back on, they may seek assistance from preda-
tory lenders, as the story below illustrates.
Ms. Leah Pyy grew up in Falmouth, Maine in a clam shop 
with no running water, and she always dreamed of owning 
a home. In 1995, she and her husband bought a home for 
themselves and their grandson, who had been living with 
them since 1993. 
“The house means the world to me, especially since it’s a 
safe place for my grandchild to live and play,” Ms. Pyy said.
She had been in a serious car accident years before that 
left her disabled, and it was not easy for the family to make 
ends meet. After buying the house, the Pyys went into debt 
and fell behind on their house payments. 
“I heard that you could get out of debt by using your 
home equity to pay credit card bills,” Ms. Pyy said, who 
soon found herself ensnared in a predatory mortgage loan. 
“There were a lot of loan papers, a lot of ﬁ ne print that didn’t 
mean anything to me. We were desperate, and the bank 
seemed to be oﬀ ering us a way out.”
They obtained a second mortgage for $31,500 at an inter-
est rate of 13.75 percent that cost $4,787 in closing costs. 
As a result of this expensive mortgage loan, the Pyys fell 
deeper and deeper in debt.
Although she now understands how to avoid predatory 
lending traps, Ms. Pyy continues to receive calls every week 
from mortgage companies that want to lend her more 
money. 
“These days, I know better – but I’m sure they’re reaching 
a lot of others who are desperate, as I was,” Ms. Pyy added.
Adapted from “Statement of Ms. Leah Pyy, Victim of Preda-
tory Mortgage Lending,” presented at Coastal Enterprises, Inc. 
press conference, February 13, 2006.
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Th e Subprime Mortgage Market and 
Predatory Lending
Subprime mortgages carry higher costs than prime loans, os-
tensibly to compensate lenders for the added risks imposed 
by borrowers who may be at greater risk to fail to repay their 
loans. In recent years, the subprime mortgage market has in-
creased signiﬁ cantly. In 1996, subprime lenders reported $90 
billion in lending. By 2004, the subprime mortgage market 
had grown to $401 billion.4 
Within the subprime market, loans with interest rates at 
least three percentage points higher than that of U.S. Trea-
sury securities of comparable maturity are considered High 
APR Loans (HALs). 5 Examining the prevalence of HALs has 
been diﬃ  cult, given the lack of consistent data.  However, the 
most recent Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 6 data 
provide some important insights into this market.  
Even more costly are what the federal Home Ownership 
Equal Protection Act (HOEPA) deﬁ nes as “high-cost loans.” 
Th ese loans charge points and fees that are 8 percent or more 
of the mortgage amount (10 percent for second mortgages) 
and interest rates of 8 percent above the U.S. Treasury yield. 
A “high-cost” loan triggers certain consumer protections 
under federal law and under some state laws, such as those 
discussed in the Maine case study included in this brief.  
Subprime lenders avoid making high-cost loans so the actual 
number of loans of this type is negligible.  
Predatory mortgage loans have been deﬁ ned as those 
loans that (1) charge more in interest and fees than needed 
to cover the associated risk; (2) contain abusive terms and 
conditions (see box); and/or (3) do not take into account the 
borrower’s ability to repay. Th ey oft en target women, minori-
ties, and communities of color. 7 Predatory loans can add a 
great deal to the cost of mortgages, costs most low-income 
borrowers cannot aﬀ ord. It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that although predatory loans are concentrated in the 
subprime market, not all subprime loans or even HALs are 
predatory.  As subprime lending activity has increased, con-
cern over wealth-stripping predatory lending has increased 
as well. 
Predatory loans oft en contain a consumer-unfriendly pre-
payment penalty, which is assessed if a borrower pays oﬀ  the 
loan before a speciﬁ ed time has elapsed. Prepayment penal-
ties can trap consumers in subprime loans—even if they 
qualify for a lower-cost loan—because they cannot aﬀ ord the 
prepayment penalty. Th ese penalties drain equity from the 
borrowers when they reﬁ nance or sell their homes and create 
an incentive for borrowers to continue paying on loans with 
higher costs than they might otherwise qualify for. 
Identifying a Predatory Mortgage Loan
Predatory mortgage lending includes a range of abusive 
terms and activities, including the following:
• Excessive points and fees—Points and fees in excess 
of ﬁ ve percent of the total loan amount are considered 
excessive. 
• Prepayment penalties—Penalty fees imposed on 
borrowers who repay all or the majority of a loan before 
a set time period.
• Loan ﬂ ipping—Reﬁ nancing a mortgage loan without 
conveying a net beneﬁ t to the borrower, usually in order 
to extract additional fees and charges. 
• Steering—A borrower is “steered” to take out a higher 
cost loan than they could have qualiﬁ ed for.
• Financed credit insurance—Financing mortgage 
insurance through a lump-sum payment folded into the 
mortgage loan.
Adapted from: 
Dickstein, Carla et al., 2006. Predatory Mortgages in Maine: 
Recent Trends and the Persistence of Abusive Lending 
Practices in the Subprime Mortgage Market. Coastal 
Enterprises, Inc., and Center for Responsible Lending.
A B O U T  T H E  D A T A
Since 1975, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) has required that all depository ﬁ nancial institutions that meet a speciﬁ c asset 
level and are headquartered in a metropolitan area are required to report information on mortgage applications.  This geographically 
based dataset provides demographic information on the applicant, the loan disposition, and other characteristics that can be used to 
track lending rates and trends.  
This information brief presents Housing Assistance Council (HAC) tabulations of 2004 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. 
For the ﬁ rst time in 2004, HMDA data include interest rate information for approved mortgage loans, providing important insight into 
the subprime lending market. 
While HMDA data are a critical resource to understanding lending trends, the limitations of these data in rural America must be ac-
knowledged. Only those depository institutions with assets of $33 million (adjusted to $35 million in 2005) that were headquartered in 
a metropolitan area were required to report HMDA data in 2004. Consequently, an untold number of rural lending data are unavailable, 
as many small, rural ﬁ nancial institutions were not required to report HMDA data. Despite these limitations, HMDA provides the best 
available information on rural lending and high cost mortgage loans. 
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Some researchers who have analyzed predatory lending 
have characterized it as “redlining in reverse.”8 Th e same 
poor and minority communities that were oft en denied ac-
cess to credit are now being ﬂ ooded with loan products that 
oft en strip equity and diminish wealth. Research has shown 
that African American and Hispanic borrowers are more 
likely to receive HALs than similarly qualiﬁ ed white borrow-
ers, regardless of income. 9 Steering borrowers to loans with 
higher fees and interest rates than they could qualify for is a 
major component of predatory lending. It has been estimat-
ed that as many as half of all subprime loan borrowers could 
in fact qualify for conventional rate mortgages.10 
Rural High APR Lending
As shown in the HMDA data, among the 555,941 rural 
mortgage loan originations reported in the 2004 HMDA 
data, 17.4 percent, or nearly 97,000, were classiﬁ ed as HALs. 
Th is was slightly higher than the national and metro rates.
Further analysis of these data also shows that HALs are 
concentrated in rural areas with chronic poverty, and, oft en, 
a high proportion of minorities. Figure 1 illustrates the 
location of HALs in rural America as identiﬁ ed in the 2004 
HMDA data. 
As shown in Figure 1, HALs can be found in rural 
counties throughout the U.S., but there are some regional 
diﬀ erences. Th roughout the northeast and the far west, most 
rural counties have high APR lending rates of less than 20 
percent. Rates of high APR lending increase considerably in 
the central and southern regions of the country, particularly 
in rural areas that have historically high rates of poverty and 
racial and ethnic minorities. In almost 500 rural counties, 
nearly all of them in central and southern regions, one-third 
or more of the total mortgage originations were for HALs. 
Th ese higher rates of high APR loans occur overwhelmingly 
in Persistent Poverty Counties. Figure 2 shows the location 
of Persistent Poverty Counties—those counties that have 
had poverty rates of 20 percent or more for the last three 
decades. 
Connected to these issues of location are issues of race 
and ethnicity. As the map shows, concentrations of HALs 
can be found across the Mississippi Delta region, in coun-
ties with Native American reservations and poor Hispanic-
American communities, and in some Appalachian com-
munities. Half of the counties with signiﬁ cant rates of higher 
cost loans –30 percent or more – are counties with minority 
populations of 33 percent or more.
Rural America tends to be more racially and ethnically 
homogenous than the rest of the nation. Less than one-ﬁ ft h 
of rural residents are minorities and 11 percent of all rural 
homeowners are minorities. As in urban areas, minorities 
in rural America receive a disproportionate share of HALs. 
Although, rural minorities account for less than 9 percent 
Table 1. 2004 High APR Mortgage Loan Originations, 
HMDA
 Total Loans High APR Mortgages 
  # %
Urban 5,243,959 810,934 15.5%
Rural 555,941 96,897 17.4%
National 5,799,900 907,831 15.6%
Source: HAC tabulations of 2004 HMDA data.
Figure 1: Map of High APR Lending
Figure 2: Map of Persistent Poverty Counties
Source: Map prepared by ERS from U.S. Census Bureau data.
Source: HAC tabulation of 2004 HMDA data.
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Figure 3. HALs by Race and Ethnicity
Source: HAC tabulations of 2004 HMDA data
of all rural HALs, minorities were much more likely to 
receive HALs than Whites. Th e proportion of HALs for rural 
minorities far exceeds that for rural non-Hispanic Whites. 
As shown in Figure 3, slightly less than one-third of all rural 
Latino and Native American borrowers received HALs in 
2004. Almost half (46.5 percent) of all rural African-Ameri-
can borrowers received a HAL. In comparison, less than 17 
percent of rural non-Hispanic White borrowers received 
high APR mortgage loans as reported by HMDA.
Manufactured Housing 
One housing sector in rural America that is particularly tied 
to high APR lending is manufactured housing, which repre-
sents 15 percent of the rural housing stock. 
Th e vast majority of manufactured housing continues to 
be ﬁ nanced using personal property loans, which do not 
have the same consumer protections as mortgage loans. Per-
sonal property loans allow borrowers to purchase a manu-
factured home with little or no down payment; however, the 
rates and terms are oft en signiﬁ cantly higher than conven-
tional mortgages. 
Lenders that do make mortgage loans for manufactured 
homes impose stricter underwriting standards than do 
personal property lenders. Many mortgage lenders require 
manufactured homes to be placed on permanent founda-
tions and on land that is privately owned. Th ese require-
ments may be beneﬁ cial to the borrower in the long run but 
oft en increase the initial cost of the home.
For those rural residents who took out a real estate loan, 
as reported in HMDA data, to purchase their manufactured 
homes in 2004, 50.7 percent received HALs (See Figure 4). 
Th e Eﬀ ects of Predatory Lending in 
Rural Communities 
Th e Center for Responsible Lending (2001) estimates that 
predatory mortgage lending practices cost borrowers at 
minimum $9.1 billion annually.a It has been demonstrated 
that certain loan term characteristics (e.g. balloon payments 
and prepayment penalties) substantially increase the likeli-
hood of foreclosure, and can jeopardize homeownership 
for those homeowners.b While there has been little research 
on the impact of predatory lending in rural communities, 
several studies have demonstrated the ﬁ nancial and physical 
impact predatory mortgage loans have on central city resi-
dents and neighborhoods. In addition to stripping the equity 
of individual homeowners and charging the most in terms of 
interest and fees to those who can least aﬀ ord it, predatory 
mortgages can have signiﬁ cant community impacts as they 
can lead to increased foreclosures and vacant housing units 
(ACORN 2000).
 Research has shown that rural borrowers are more likely 
than those in urban areas to be subjected to prepayment 
penalties.12 One study showed that in 2002, rural subprime 
borrowers were six percent more likely than urban borrow-
ers to have a loan that included a prepayment penalty with 
a term of at least two years (CRL 2004). More tellingly, rural 
subprime borrowers were 20 percent more likely in 2002 to 
take out a mortgage with a prepayment penalty carrying a 
term of ﬁ ve or more years than urban borrowers.
 Overall, 63 percent of rural subprime mortgage loans 
imposed a prepayment penalty on borrowers with a two-
year penalty period. And 39 percent of all rural subprime 
mortgages studied had pre-payment penalties carrying terms 
of three years or longer (CRL 2004). 
Figure 4. Percent of rural property type with high cost loan
a Eric Stein. 2001. Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending. 
Center for Responsible Lending, Durham, NC.
b Quercia, Stegman, and Davis. 2005. Th e Impact of Predatory Loan Terms 
on Subprime Foreclosures: Th e Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and Source: HAC tabulations of 2004 HMDA data
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Conclusion and Recommendations
A home is the most valuable asset for most low-income 
rural residents, as it is for most Americans. Predatory loans 
diminish the value of homeownership because they strip 
equity and undermine families’ ability to build assets. As 
discussed, although rural residents receive HALs at only 
slightly higher percentages than urban homebuyers, in rural 
areas, minorities are signiﬁ cantly more likely than whites to 
receive these loans. 
To protect the beneﬁ ts of homeownership, national and 
state oﬃ  cials should adopt and enforce policies that bet-
ter regulate supprime lending terms, monitor lending and 
real estate practices in this growing sector, and educate and 
protect borrowers.
Needed Federal Action 
Th e Homeownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), 
which passed in 1994, applies to all lenders in all states, 
while preserving the authority of individual states to enact 
laws that provide more rigorous consumer protections.13 
Recent attempts to pass new anti-predatory legislation at 
the federal level are conﬂ icted over preserving state control 
versus creating uniform federal standards that preempt state 
law.
Th e mortgage industry has pushed strongly for uniform 
standards and federal preemption of state laws – focusing 
on H.R. 1295, sponsored by U.S. Reps. Bob Ney and Paul 
Kanjorski. Although the industry argues that complying with 
a myriad of state laws is costly, research by the Center for 
Responsible Lending has shown the cost of such compliance 
to be approximately $1 per mortgage transaction.14 
Many advocates for low and moderate income families 
support a strong federal law that does not preempt stronger 
state laws; one example cited is H.R. 1182, sponsored by U.S. 
Reps. Brad Miller, Melvin Watt and Barney Frank. Th ese 
groups argue that states need the ability to change their laws 
quickly to respond to changing markets and stamp out abu-
sive practices that may diﬀ er from state to state.  
Th e Center for Responsible Lending has made recom-
mendations to address unfair lending to racial and ethnic 
minorities in both rural and urban areas. Th ose recommen-
dations call for stricter oversight of yield spread premiums, 
which encourage mortgage brokers to steer borrowers into 
subprime loans; requiring lenders and brokers to oﬀ er only 
loans that are suitable and reasonably advantageous for 
a given borrower; giving regulators wider authority and 
adequate resources to fully enforce fair lending laws; and 
creating incentives and new policies to ensure that minority 
borrowers are fairly served.15
Policymakers should also consider the following recom-
mendations:
• In addition to anti-predatory lending laws, Congress 
should consider strengthening the Community Reinvest-
ment Act. CRA has been a critical tool used by local com-
munities to encourage and increase access to aﬀ ordable 
lending products. More eﬀ ective use of the CRA process 
in rural communities and a strengthening of the law 
could result in more aﬀ ordable lending products targeted 
to rural borrowers and less reliance on subprime prod-
ucts. 
• Government agencies, including the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, private lenders, and 
other stakeholders should collaborate to fund, design, 
and implement eﬀ ective, independent housing counsel-
ing programs and materials for low-income borrowers 
considering subprime loans. Federal regulators could 
stimulate banks to help fund these activities through the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) examinations or 
through incentives.16
• Th e federal government should require small banks and 
those headquartered in non-metropolitan areas, which 
are now exempt from many reporting requirements 
under HMDA, to comply with proposed new reporting 
requirements in order to provide a full picture of lending 
practices in rural areas. Rural communities would then 
have a better understanding of lending trends and activity 
and would be better prepared to address lending abuses. 
Needed State Actions 
While federal policy can be an important tool to help protect 
borrowers from predatory mortgage lending, it should not 
preempt state policy. In passing anti-predatory legislation, 
some states17 have closed loopholes in HOEPA and placed 
limits on abusive loans and practices. In general, the state 
laws attempt to: 
• Reduce excessive points and fees that strip equity from 
borrowers. Th is is usually done by reducing the percent-
age of points and fees (from 8 to 5 percent) that deﬁ ne a 
high-cost loan and trigger additional consumer protec-
tions.  Also, additional fees that are presently not counted 
are included in the total percentage. 
• Provide consumers with additional protections for high-
cost loans, such as requiring mandatory credit counseling, 
prohibiting pre-payment penalties, or prohibiting the 
ﬁ nancing of fees. 
• Require interest rates to reﬂ ect the risk of the loan rather 
than upfront points and fees that strip equity from bor-
rowers. Interest rates are more transparent to consumers.  
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• Protect consumers in disputes with lenders. Some states 
prohibit mandatory arbitration, which tends to favor 
lenders; some give borrowers legal protections even if 
their mortgage is sold in the secondary market.  
• Require a net tangible beneﬁ t to the borrower in any reﬁ -
nance loan. Th is is designed to prevent loan ﬂ ipping and 
equity drain through excessive fees. 
Other states should follow the lead of “best practice” states 
such as North Carolina and Massachusetts, and adopt simi-
lar policies to protect vulnerable homebuyers both in rural 
and non-rural communities in their states.
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A Case Study from Maine
• Abusive lending terms in subprime foreclosure records. Sub-
prime records in four district courts showed loan terms strongly 
associated with predatory lending, including: mandatory 
arbitration (17 percent of records); prepayment penalties (11 
percent); points and fees over ﬁ ve percent; and evidence of ﬂ ip-
ping. In total, at least 26 percent of the records contained one or 
more of the following terms: mandatory arbitration, points and 
fees over ﬁ ve percent, or prepayment penalties. Most records 
did not document loan characteristics, so our ﬁ ndings very 
likely substantially under-report the extent of predatory lending 
characteristics. 
Stakeholders also described extensive debt consolidation driving 
a market for subprime loans with abusive loan terms, aggressive 
sales tactics and equity stripping. Interviewees included mort-
gage brokers, bank and credit union lenders, bankruptcy trustees, 
bankruptcy attorneys, housing counselors and borrowers. Th ose 
interviewed also noted general concerns about inﬂ ated appraisals; 
“bottom feeders6“ targeting borrowers in bankruptcy; steering and 
ﬂ ipping. One of the borrowers interviewed lost about $100,000 in 
equity to predatory practices, and ﬁ ve of the nine borrowers inter-
viewed were either in, or had gone through, the foreclosure process.
Characteristics of Subprime Mortgage Market in Rural 
Maine
Between January 2004 and May 2005, 52 percent of the Maine 
subprime originations were in rural parts of the state, while only 42 
percent of Maine’s population is rural. Maine ranked fourth in the 
nation for the concentration of subprime mortgage loans in rural 
areas. Maine’s rural counties that are further away from more urban 
areas of southern Maine had higher concentrations of subprime 
mortgage loans as a percentage of total mortgage loans. Th e high-
est concentrations of subprime loans were in some of the poorest 
rural “rim counties” – Somerset, Washington and Piscataquis. Th is 
is consistent with the ﬁ ndings that rural communities have fewer 
lending options and are more susceptible to subprime lenders. 
However, the research could not determine whether the high con-
centration of subprime loans in rural areas reﬂ ected a higher risk 
for these loans. 
Most of the data that indicate predatory lending characteristics 
of subprime loans are not available by rural areas. What data are 
Introduction
In 2005, Coastal Enterprises, Inc. (CEI) and the Center for Re-
sponsible Lending (CRL)1, conducted the ﬁ rst systematic investiga-
tion of the nature and extent of predatory lending in Maine.2 Th e 
impetus for the study was a concern that Maine citizens were not 
receiving the same protections against predatory lending practices 
that are available in other states such as Massachusetts, New Mexico 
and North Carolina. 
Th e research examined trends in Maine’s subprime mortgage 
market and the characteristics of loans made in Maine from 2000 
through 2005 to determine if they had predatory characteristics. 
A number of data sources were used, including available empiri-
cal data on the subprime market3; publicly available foreclosure 
records and lien histories; and interviews with various stakeholders 
and borrowers. In addition, the researchers reviewed the relevant 
laws and regulations in Maine’s Consumer Credit Code to answer 
a basic question: Do current laws in Maine provide an appropriate 
framework to regulate subprime mortgage lending, given the lend-
ing practices revealed by the research?
Key Findings of Maine’s Subprime Mortgage Market
Like other parts of the country, Maine’s subprime mortgage market 
has grown dramatically. Between 2000 and 2004, its subprime 
market grew 436 percent by dollar volume. In 2004, it topped 
$1 billion with about 8000 loans. In 2003 subprime loans (exclud-
ing subprime loans for manufactured housing) were almost 10 
percent of the total Maine mortgage market. Over 30 percent of 
all subprime loans made in Maine by lenders on HUD’s Subprime 
Lender List in 20034 were from two out-of-state non-bank lenders, 
Option One Mortgage Corporation and Ameriquest. 
Mainers obtain a higher percentage of their subprime loans in 
the form of cash-out reﬁ nances than do borrowers in any other 
state. Between January 2004 and May 2005, 65 percent of the state’s 
subprime mortgage market represented cash-out reﬁ nances,5 which 
is where most abuses in the subprime mortgage market typi-
cally occur. During the same period, only 28 percent of subprime 
mortgage loans in Maine were used for home purchases, the lowest 
in the nation. Th is trend is consistent with Maine’s high home 
ownership rate, rising property values in many parts of the state, 
rising consumer debt, pockets of economic distress, and aging 
population—conditions that make it vulnerable to predatory lend-
ing practices. 
Predatory lending is evident in Maine’s subprime loans. An 
examination of subprime mortgage loans shows the following 
predatory characteristics: 
• Steering. A conservative analysis of data suggests that at least 
15 percent of the subprime mortgages in Maine between 2003 
and 2005 went to families who could have qualiﬁ ed for a less 
expensive loan. 
• Prepayment Penalties with terms greater than 24 months have 
increased, albeit only marginally, since the passage of Maine’s 
2003 anti-predatory lending law from 12 percent of subprime 
originations to 15 percent. 
Table 1: Summary of Multiple Reﬁ nances seen in Portland, 
South Paris, Newport and Lincoln County District Courts 
Registries of Deeds Sample
District  Number of Reﬁ nances Multiple Total Percentage 
Court lien histories where interest  reﬁ nances by possible of possible 
 reviewed for rate increased subprime ﬂ ips ﬂ ips for
 subprime between lender  sample
 foreclosures subprime loans
Portland 30 3 7 10 33
Lincoln 11 3 1 4 36
South Paris 20 0 5 5 20
Newport 15 0 2 2 13
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available come from 357 foreclosure and lien records determined 
to be subprime loans7 in three rural county courthouses in Lincoln 
County, South Paris, and Newport. Predatory lending character-
istics evident in these records included excessive points and fees, 
mandatory arbitration clauses, prepayment penalties over two 
years, and multiple reﬁ nances that suggest possible ﬂ ipping8 of 
loans with no net tangible beneﬁ t to the borrower as shown below.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Predatory mortgage lending in Maine leads to lost wealth for fami-
lies and, too oft en, lost homes. A 2001 study estimated that Maine 
lost $23.4 million in 2000 through equity stripping practices.9 Th is 
ﬁ gure does not include foreclosure losses. One out of ﬁ ve subprime 
mortgages originated in 1999 entered foreclosure by 2005, giving 
Maine the highest cumulative rate in New England for that period.10 
It is not clear how much of that ﬁ gure is a result of predatory 
mortgage lending, but as cited above, national research has shown 
a higher risk of foreclosure from some predatory mortgage lending 
practices. 
Th e study found that Maine’s current legal framework fails to 
protect its families from the abusive lending practices identiﬁ ed in 
the research. A so-called anti-predatory lending law passed in 2003 
(PL49) has not provided adequate protections, and in fact legalized 
some of the abusive practices identiﬁ ed in the national Household 
and Beneﬁ cial Finance Corporations lawsuit settled by the Maine 
Attorney General in 2003. Additionally, many of the practices 
alleged in the lawsuit � such as excessive points and fees, prepay-
ment penalties, abusive use of open-ended credit, and ﬂ ipping � are 
largely legal in today’s Maine market.
Protections against predatory lending could be substantially 
strengthened through state legislative action. Maine regulates 
eighty-nine percent of recognized subprime lenders identiﬁ ed in 
the HUD Subprime Lender List. In addition, Maine regulates all 
mortgage brokers. As such, Maine can draw on the experience of a 
number of best practice states with strong anti-predatory laws, such 
as North Carolina, New Mexico and Massachusetts, to improve its 
legislation and ensure that more Maine families hold on to their 
homes and their hard-earned wealth acquired through home equi-
ty. A recent study by the Center for Responsible Lending of 28 state 
reforms found that strong state laws are working well to prevent 
predatory lending. Furthermore, borrowers have ready access to 
subprime credit in these states., and borrowers pay about the same 
or lower interest rates for subprime mortgages.11 Recommended 
changes in Maine’s Consumer Credit Code are as follows.
Redeﬁ ne what is meant by “high-cost” loans and provide more 
protections for these loans
Th e percentage of points and fees that trigger a “high-cost” loan 
should be reduced, more types of fees must be counted, and open 
ended loans, such as a line of credit, must be subject to the deﬁ ni-
tion. Extra protections for “high–cost” loans include mandatory 
credit counseling, prohibiting pre-payment penalties, and prohibit-
ing the ﬁ nancing of fees. 
Ensure appropriate recourse for consumers if they have problems 
with their loans 
Mandatory arbitration should be prohibited, thus ensuring that 
borrowers can pursue a dispute with the lender through the court 
system. Assignee liability provisions should be adopted that allow 
borrowers to pursue justice from secondary market lenders who 
buy their loans.
Require that loans that are reﬁ nanced have a net tangible beneﬁ t 
to the consumer. 
Th is provision will prevent loan ﬂ ipping and stripping of equity 
from borrowers through excessive points and fees. 
Th ese recommendations provide more transparency of the true 
costs of loans to consumers and more protections. None of the 
recommendations prevent a lender from charging whatever points 
or fees or interest rates it considers necessary. If the threshold of a 
high-cost loan is lowered, the lender can still make a loan that ex-
ceeds the threshold but would trigger additional consumer protec-
tions. While strong legislation is essential, solving the problem of 
predatory mortgage lending requires complementary eﬀ orts such 
as consumer/ﬁ nancial education and better outreach by responsible 
lenders to borrowers who might otherwise fall into the hands of 
predatory lenders. However, such actions will have little impact 
unless they are supported by eﬀ ective policies to help ensure that 
responsible lenders can compete in Maine. 
By Carla Dickstein and Hannah Th omas, 
adapted from Dickstein et al (2006). 
Endnotes
1 CEI, based in Wiscasset, Maine, is a community development cor-
poration (CDC) and community development ﬁ nance institution 
(CDFI). CRL is a subsidiary of Self-Help Community Credit Union 
headquartered n Durahm, North Carolina, which is also a CDFI.
2 See Carla Dickstein, Hannah Th omas and Uriah King. 2006. 
Predatory Mortgages in Maine: Recent Trenads and the Persistence 
of Abusive Lending in the Subprime Mortgage Market. Coastal 
Enterprises, Inc., Wiscasset, ME. Th is study was supported by the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation, Maine’s Attorney General and AARP. 
3 Th ese included data collected under the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA), from the Mortgage Bankers’ Association 
and most important, from an industry database that compiles 
self-reported data from the mortgage industry on the characteris-
tics of loans, described in Dickstein et al (2006). 
4 Data is from the HUD 2003 list of subprime lenders. 
5 A cash-out reﬁ nance gives the mortgagor cash back aft er paying 
oﬀ  the mortgage , any junior mortgage and settlement costs. Th e 
cash paid out comes out of the equity in the house and is oft en used 
to pay oﬀ  credit card debt. 
6 Th ese individuals oﬀ er to get people out of Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
by reﬁ nancing the loan at outrageous terms that homeowners 
cannot aﬀ ord.  In almost every case,  the loan leads eventually to 
foreclosure, and the excessive fees charged in this last-ditch reﬁ -
nancing strip away any equity the homeowner may have had left  in 
the house.   
7 Subprime loans were determined by the lenders’ inclusion in the 
HUD Subprime Lender List, and in the top 25 list from Inside B 
&C Lending, an industry publication.
8 In order to fully assess ﬂ ipping, we would have to review every 
borrower’s loan documents and loan history. Hence we refer to 
“possible ﬂ ips.”
9 See Eric Stein. 2001. Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory 
Lending. Center for Responsible Lending, Durham, NC.
10 Th is ﬁ nding is from the industry database analysis. Details of this 
database are described in Farris and Richardson, “Th e Geography 
of Supbrime Mortgage Prepayment Penalty Patterns.” Housing 
Policy Debate 15 (3) 687-714.
11 See Wei Li and Keith Ernst. 2006. Th e Best Value in the Subprime 
Market: State Predatory Lending Reforms. Durham, NC: Center 
for Responsible Lending. Th is peer-reviewed study used statisti-
cal analysis to compare states with anti-predatory lending laws to 
states without these laws. 
